SA involvement could bring terror home

Pressure is mounting on South Africa to become militarily involved in the conflict in Somalia in the wake of the 11 July al-Shabaab bomb attacks in Kampala that claimed the lives of 80 people, increased attacks on Ugandan and Burundian troops in Mogadishu, and the continuing attacks on maritime trade by Somali pirates. Involvement, however, will come with some serious risks for the country, including terrorist attacks similar to that which occurred in Kampala. At the same time, as a leading power in Africa, South Africa can hardly not become involved in some way much longer.

Minister of Defence Lindiwe Sisulu told Parliament’s portfolio committee on Defence and Military Veterans last week that South Africa was under increasing pressure from the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to send soldiers to reinforce the AU’s peace-keeping mission (Amisom) in Somalia.

On 23 July 2010, just before the African Union Summit in Kampala, the AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping made it known that he had asked countries such as South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea to send troops to Somalia to boost the currently under-strengthed African Union Mission in Somalia.

There have been requests from the EU and pressure from the US  for South Africa to become involved in the Somali situation.

Sisulu made the committee aware that military involvement would have far-reaching implications for South Africa, not only because there is likely to be loss of life, but also due to the risk of terror attacks at home.

It was because of these domestic security considerations that the question of the country’s involvement in Somalia could only be raised after the Fifa Soccer World Cup tournament.

To these dangers the fact can be added that the substantial community of Somali refugees in South Africa has been, and probably remains, one of the main targets of recent xenophobic attacks in the country.

While South African forces are already involved in peace-keeping operations in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic added involvement in Somalia could put the Defense Force’s available manpower under considerable pressure. There would further be substantial cost implications.

In the meantime, the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), in an article for the publication Polity, warned that involvement could lead to an Afghanistan type situation where the United States and NATO countries have been involved in fighting the Taliban since 2001. From many sources it is clear that their involvement is increasingly becoming counterproductive, extremely costly and a lost cause.

Somalia, however, is central to the US’s 'war on terror' and is lending support to Amisom in terms of money, weapons, logistical support and intelligence. However, having burnt its fingers with Somalia before, it is unlikely the US will become directly involved again.

Minister Sisulu, in addressing the parliamentary committee, insisted that if South African forces went to Somalia,it would be for a limited period and only as part of a broad, shared African mission. But as history and experience elsewhere in the world have proved, once involved it may not be all that easy to place a deadline on withdrawal.

Amisom was first deployed in 2007 to protect the Transitional Federal Government in the Somali capital, but has failed to stabilise the country. Increasing the number of troops is unlikely to improve this situation, unless a substantial effort to broker a political solution can be mounted at the same time.

Sisulu also told the committee that the South African Cabinet had to decide soon whether it would send forces, including a maritime component, to protect from pirates the sea lanes along the Somali coast – a complicated problem with which the international community has been battling for some time now. Pirate operations seem to be constantly moving further and further south and becoming a threat to SADC waters.

The Somali problem is becoming a bit of a catch-22 situation for South Africa. While the risk of becoming involved is clear; on the other hand, to not send forces would undermine the country’s diplomatic standing on the continent, to which it has a responsibility.

“We need to start discussions on a very urgent basis,” Deputy Minister of Defence Thabang Makwetla told the parliamentary committee.

In its commentary, the ISS wrote: “Simply increasing Amisom's size is unlikely to succeed unless accompanied by a political solution. The Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in support of the TFG from December 2006 to January 2009 provides a lesson to be heeded. Despite heavy reinforcements, their support of the TFG exacerbated the government's lack of local credibility and legitimacy.

“What has changed? Why would a surge of troops stabilise the situation now? The first reaction by the South African Minister for International Relations and Co-operation M. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, to the AU's request for South Africa to send troops, was that Somalia's is a political problem and that deploying military forces in isolation will not be the solution. It seems that is not only the position of South Africa but also that of other African leaders. South Africa has in the past acted in terms of the country's White Paper on Peacekeeping when requested to deploy into a conflict area, and it is likely that this will be the case again.

“The AU must relook the situation holistically and not only increase force levels, but again try and to put in place an all-inclusive political solution. This will ensure that a peacekeeping mission will have a clear mandate linked to political objectives and an exit strategy,” the ISS added.

A political solution, however, will not be easy to find. With, in addition to other factors, an entrenched clan system, Somalia is an extremely complicated environment. The upscaling of military action is rather fuelling radicalism and the potential of jihad suicide bombers coming into play, than moving closer to a solution.