Death of two liberation movements
Developments in southern Africa's two former Portuguese territories illustrate how difficult it is for a liberation movement to transform itself into a democratically-minded political party. Many former liberation movements battle with the challenge. Globally, and in Africa in particular, there are many examples of movements who could not complete the transition.
The outcome of this September's general election in Angola is a foregone conclusion: the MPLA is certain of victory. The only question is whether the ruling party will improve on their previous election result in 2008. Then, the MPLA won over 81% of the vote and took 181 of the 220 seats in the National Assembly.
Since the previous election the Angolan parliament approved a new constitution which has abolished direct presidential elections.
The main opposition party, Unita, unsuccessfully opposed these measures and warned of “rising social tension,“ but few took any notice. In its latest bid to show some muscle, Unita accused the MPLA of exerting too much influence over the organisation of the upcoming general election and even walked out of the National Assembly over parliament's decision to ratify the re-appointment of the head of the National Electoral Commission (CNE).
Unita is against the ropes and fighting for survival. The September 2012 election outcome may well signal the demise of one of Africa’s most controversial liberation movements. Widely respected when it fought Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, it was discarded in the Cold War-era and ended up as a proxy of the West and apartheid South Africa.
Mozambique
A similar situation is noticeable on the other side of the subcontinent in Mozambique. Renamo cannot claim to have fought to free Mozambique from Portuguese colonialism. On the contrary, Renamo was a product of a brains trust set up by Ian Smith to disrupt the efforts of the Mozambique-based black liberation movements who were trying to overthrow white minority rule in what was then Rhodesia.
After Zimbabwe gained independance, Renamo was handed to the South African military and used to destabilise Mozambique as part of a larger strategy to force the Frelimo government to be less accommodating towards the ANC presence in Mozambique. The rationale was that Renamo was fighting to protect and promote democracy against the socialist ideals championed by Frelimo.
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In both Angola and Mozambique, agreements were reached, after protracted negotiations, which ended armed conflict and provided a roadmap for democratic multiparty elections.
Immense challenge
Unita and Renamo had to transform from rebel movements into political parties while the MPLA and Frelimo were expected to contest an election against an opponent that was responsible for most of their problems.
Unita tragically failed to transform from an effective fighting machine into a political party. In Jonas Savimbi, Unita had a charismatic leader, and Unita was disciplined and well organised. Unita also enjoyed considerable support among the Angolan population; they had the potential to make a successful transition.
In the first democratic election in Angola in September 1992 Unita received 34% of the vote and 70 of the 200 seats. The MPLA emerged victorious with 54% of the vote and 129 seats. In the presidential election Unita did better: Savimbi received 41% of the vote versus the 50% of Eduardo dos Santos and the MPLA.
By all accounts it was a close contest, but Savimbi rejected the result, saying that it was neither free nor fair. He refused to contest a second round and opted to resume the civil war – a very unfortunate decision.
With the passage of time the circumstances that prevailed then have faded from memory. But it is hard not to think about how different things could have been had Savimbi and his advisors agreed to give democracy a chance.
Savimbi’s violent death in 2002 left Unita in disarray. When it agreed to participate in the September 2008 national assembly election it was comprehensively beaten, winning only 10% of the vote compared to the MPLAs 82%.
A new constitution was adopted early in 2010, before presidential elections could be held, that stipulated that the president would no longer be elected by the people, but by the national assembly. The national assembly however will agree to elect the leader of the party that obtained the highest number of votes for the national assembly. President dos Santos can therefore be sure of another term after this year's September elections.
In another setback Abel Chivukuvuku, possibly Unita's most influential leader, recently decided to quit. He plans to start a new political movement to contest the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Unita’s current president, Isaias Samakuva, has largely been blamed for Unita’s declining electoral and financial fortunes. There is a general perception that Chivukuvuku’s departure and the September 2012 election will marginalise Unita further and might well signal their end.
In Mozambique the scenario is very similar.
In the country's first multiparty elections in 1994 President Chissano received 53% of the vote against the 34% of Alfonso Dhlakama. Frelimo took 129 of the 250 seats in the national assembly against the 112 of Renamo with the rest going to minor parties.
In the 1999 elections Renamo improved on the 1994 result with Dhlakama as presidential candidate getting 48% of the vote and Renamo increasing its representation in the national assembly from 112 to 117. After that it was all downhill.
In the 2004 elections support for Dhlakama fell to 32% and Renamo’s representation in the national assembly was reduced to 90 seats. The 2009 election was devastating. Dhlakama’s support fell to a paltry 16% and parliamentary representation to 51 seats.
Like Unita, Renamo failed to transition from a fighting force to a political party. Partly this is due to an acute lack of funding and a seeming inability to spend available funds wisely.
Renamo’s biggest liability however is undoubtedly it leader.
From a sometime serious contender for the Mozambican presidency Dhlakama has turned into a highly irresponsible and embarrassing leader. He has lived in self-imposed exile in Nampula City in northern Mozambique for the past couple of years, and regularly issues bizarre orders and threats.
In the latest example, Dhlakama promised a “December revolution” late last year, coupled with massive anti-government demonstrations that would sweep Frelimo from power. Nothing materialised.
With the exception of its parliamentary group, none of the other structures of Renamo function anymore.
It was recently reported that Renamo’s National Council has not met for more than a year. Under its statutes, it should meet at least twice a year. One of its powers is to approve the party’s accounts.
A Renamo spokesperson blamed this failure on the fact that Renamo does not have enough money to organise the required meetings.
Democracy the loser
The collapse of Unita and Renamo as political forces seem to be foregone conclusions. Both Angola and Mozambique are de jure multiparty democracies, but the demise of the biggest opposition parties risks transforming both into de facto one-party states.
This is by no means the fault of either the MPLA or Frelimo, but to strengthen democracy it is imperative that younger and more dynamic opposition forces step forward to continue the fight.

Mister Wong
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