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Are US efforts in Afghanistan indeed making the West safer?In early December 2009, United States President Barack Obama gave the order to his military to begin a troop surge in Afghanistan which would see the number of American soldiers in the war-torn nation reach just below the 100 000 mark. “We did not ask for this fight,” Obama declared in front of a military audience, before travelling later that month to accept the Nobel Peace Prize in Norway.
There he defended US involvement in the conflict by deploying the notion of a “Just War”.
Adolf Hitler could not be defeated by non-violent means, and Al-Qaeda will never voluntarily lay down its arms, he stated. US forces should be thanked, he said, for spilling their blood in order to win security once again for the West.
But as Al-Qaeda finds a safe haven in Yemen, and as many citizens of the West themselves are radicalised in international terror campaigns, questions must be asked of the foundational premise of Obama’s Just War in Afghanistan.
Are US efforts there indeed making the West safer, and will the Afghanistan population benefit from the perpetuated military involvement? Such questions, and their answers, affect us all.
The War in Afghanistan has become known as the war that will not end. The country has not known stable peace since the end of the 1970s.
Constantly, it has found itself embroiled in larger geopolitical strife that traces its origins to World War 2 and the beginning of the Cold War.
In 1977, as the Communist government of Afghanistan floundered, the Soviet Union sent in troops to quash the opposition to its own imperial aims. The US responded by joining forces with the right-wing dictatorship of Pakistan, by together supporting the Islamic freedom fighters known as the mujahideen with guns and money.
The Soviets were repelled, and the Islamic fighters, among them Osama bin Laden, were left dizzied at having defeated an “Evil Empire” in the name of their militant brand of Islam. Jihad was in the air.
Finally, in 1989, the US cut aid to its Islamic allies, and in the resulting vacuum, chaos reigned.
The most extreme sects of the mujahideen prevailed and gave birth to the Taliban, who initially found support among the West, as they seemed to be the only hope of stabilising the region and allowing foreign business interest to return to the area. Such support was short-lived, and even before the events of September 11, there were American military plans in place to topple the government of Afghanistan.
But before then, Islamic militants had begun to turn their attention to the remaining Evil Empire present within the globe – the United States.
Al-Qaeda had emerged in the badlands of Afghanistan – hosting training camps and indoctrination centres. The results were tragic.
US embassies were bombed in Kenya and Tanzania, and a warship was attacked off the coast of Yemen.
Yet, US leaders seemed to ignore the ticking time bomb – before it exploded on the east coast of America in September 2001.
After the tragic events of 9/11, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the military alliance of the old Allied Powers, invoked for the first time in its history Article 5 of its charter: an attack on a NATO country is an attack upon all NATO countries.
President George W. Bush had the full backing of the Western world as he declared war on the Taliban, the ruling regime of Afghanistan, who had been accused of harbouring Al-Qaeda mastermind, Bin Laden.
The Taliban protested, promising to try Bin Laden in its own Islamic courts. Bush dismissed the idea. “We’re not willing to discuss guilt or innocence. We know he is guilty,” Bush declared, as he sent in his troops to assist in the overthrow of the oppressive and tyrannical Taliban by its opposition, the Northern Alliance.
Bush also brushed aside NATO’s pledge, instead deciding on American autonomy in the invasion.
Yet, a coalition force emerged nevertheless as the international community reacted in shock to the threat of the new jihad-style terrorism.
The Taliban was crushed, while Bin Laden somehow managed to escape apprehension when coalition forces bungled an operation in the Tora Bora hills.
He is now said to have found haven in the lawless tribal areas that occupy the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
A new government was created under Afghan President Hamid Karzai, after the country invoked an ancient protocol known as loya jirga, a ‘grand assembly’ by which tribal and political leaders come together to direct the future of the nation and to resolve disputes.
Yet, as US attention turned to Iraq and the post-9/11 ‘shock and awe’ zeal faded, not only did the Taliban and its internationalist ally Al-Qaeda re-energise, but the population became dissatisfied both with the reckless and casual dominance of the occupying forces and with its government, which largely had bungled the vast amounts of Western aid that had flowed into its coffers.
This problem was exacerbated by the recent claims that Karzai won the last election via fraudulent means, as well as dark rumours that his brother, a known US intelligence ally, benefits from the widespread narcotics industry that funds so much violence in Afghanistan and the Middle East.
And now the International Security Assistance Force, the United Nations-sanctioned security force that is guided by NATO and the US, has to deal not only with a security threat but a battle for legitimacy in the so-called ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population.
It is foolish to separate these two main problems – legitimacy and security. If a force is seen to be illegitimate, it will never be secure because it will never win the trust of the very people it is aiming to protect.
The Bush era invoked sweeping rhetoric of nation-building in the Middle East – the Obama era has attempted to narrow the scope of American goals and thus avoid the legitimacy issue.
Obama has stated that his aim is merely to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda and its allies.
His man on the ground, NATO commander general Stanley McChrystal, has informed his commander-in-chief that the current troop levels cannot perform such a task, and that the battle against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is being lost, even as the borderlands remain lawless havens to insurgents. Hence the massive troop surge.
Obama is hoping to recreate some of the recent successes in Iraq (although he opposed the surge undertaken there while he was still a senator) where the local population, tired of Al-Qaeda, rallied together and supported the US in its bid to knock out the strongholds of
the insurgents.
But the question remains: does the US-led coalition have the support of the population?
Such a question is cast in shadow as a result of the corruption of the US-bolstered Afghanistan government.
If not, one must wonder whether any number of troops can rescue a poor situation. One only need think of Vietnam, when Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon poured down consistent destruction upon the Vietnamese, only to give historians one of the tragic lines of the 1960s: “We had to destroy this village in order to save it.”
US policies have long been built upon the notion of redemptive violence. After the tragedy of 9/11, the belief goes that further violence is required to burn away the bitter fires of terrorist hatred. It does not take a genius to see the obvious flaws in such logic, particularly in the light of recent events.
On Christmas Day 2009, a Nigerian student stepped onto a plane travelling from Amsterdam to Detroit with explosives taped to his leg. Despite his father having warned US authorities about his son’s radicalism, despite having travelled to Yemen for Al-Qaeda training, he was allowed onto the flight. It took the efforts of fellow passengers to prevent the impending explosion.
Added to such incidents is the growing number of US citizens who have themselves attempted to aid terror campaigns.
The US spends trillions of dollars fighting wars and nation-building in order to protect the West from terror, yet it seems as though the most simple of precautionary measures are being neglected.
There is another cost to the American wars: civilian lives. And each time a bomb in Afghanistan takes the life of a civilian, family members and relatives no longer desire to assist Western forces – instead, they begin to sympathise with the rhetoric of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, calling for the removal of the invaders.
Does violence redeem violence? When the entire world becomes a battlefield, and in an era of modern machinery in which destruction takes only the efforts of small groups, the answer is too often a resounding “no”.
But what are America’s alternatives?
Three months before 9/11, South African scenario forecasters Clem Sunter and Chantell Ilbury published an open letter to President Bush in which they outlined two divergent paths for US global leadership to take. These two paths were named “Gilded Cage” and “Friendly Planet”.
The first scenario, the one seemingly decided upon by US leadership, involves an American bid to protect itself in a cage of militancy and self-protection.
The second would involve America outstretching its hands to a world of poverty so as to mutually benefit both the poor and the rich, the powerful and the weak.
As pointed out, a Gilded Cage is never impenetrable by those radicalised by violence, while a Friendly Planet paradoxically provides security for oneself.
Greg Mortenson, the US philanthropist who has helped build or support over a hundred schools in rural Afghanistan, has taken the Friendly Planet approach. With a budget miniscule in comparison to the US Defence Budget, Mortenson has applied the wisdom that formed the title of his best-selling book, Three Cups of Tea – it is upon the third cup of tea that one becomes family with one’s neighbour.
It is a small wonder that Mortenson opposes Obama’s latest policy.
There is also the example of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), formed during the Soviet invasion of 1977. RAWA supports literacy classes for women, educational craft centres, refugee relief aid, orphanages, and medical services. It opposes oppression from all sources, whether it be from the fundamentalists backed by America during the Soviet invasion, or the Karzai government currently propped up by the US, whom leaders of RAWA condemn as “mafia”.
However, the better angels of the Karzai government must be lauded for ventures such as the National Solidarity Programme, whereby villagers manage aid and resources under their own supervision, according to a ‘citizen-empowerment paradigm’. The point may be critical to the US and its endeavour to nation-build in one of the poorest regions of the world.
US Defence Secretary Robert Gates has said development can only take place once security has been established. But when security is only obtainable upon the blood of civilians, what chance does such a security have of enduring? Such security is illegitimate.
Maybe it sounds fantastical for the might of US leadership to learn from such Friendly Planet ventures – ventures whereby power is freely abdicated for the benefit of others. But it is only such a brand of leadership that can really aspire to secure the world, and indeed, the United States.
As the financial systems of the world teeter in the storms of a globalised world, and as emerging powers such as China and Russia seemingly ignore the moral claims of climate reform while doing business with the dictators of Sudan and the like, such an approach may provide America with one last chance to lead the world. ?
Chris Walburger
Clearly US has lost a lot and more will follow if the false war is not stopped.