The African position

As the date for the COP 17 negotiations in Durban draws closer, the positions of the Parties become clearer, and a more accurate picture of what is at stake begins to emerge. Will Durban be the graveyard of the Kyoto Protocol, or will it be the birthplace of a second commitment period and a new era of optimism in the ability of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) multilateral process to take charge of runaway emissions and provide enough money for sorely needed adaptation measures in the world’s poorest countries?

As the only negotiating body that represents an entire continent, the Africa Group of Negotiators on Climate Change (AGN), negotiating on home turf for the first time, has formulated a tough and unequivocal stance.

In this interview, conducted by Andy Mason of OneWorld Sustainable Investments, AGN chair Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu candidly spells out the options.

What are the three most important issues facing African negotiators in Durban?

Africa is seeking a balanced and ambitious outcome from Durban, that is based on science, that is fair and that honours the promises all countries have made to each other in the UN Climate Convention and its Kyoto Protocol.

The most important issues facing the African negotiators are the same as the most important issues facing the whole world.

First, we need to agree to a level of co-operative global efforts that cuts global emissions to safe levels for Africa and the world. In Durban, we need to agree to global reductions for 2050 that limit warming to well below 1.5 degrees Celsius in Africa.

Secondly, we need to close the “mitigation gap” by ensuring that the developed countries take on fair and appropriate contributions to this global effort. Recent analysis by the UN and other leading research institutions demonstrates that their weak pledges, along with accounting loopholes, would result in their doing very little or nothing to curb climate change before 2020.

Thirdly, we need to close the “finance gap” by ensuring the developed countries meet their commitments to enable the adaptation and mitigation efforts in developing countries, so that we are protected from the worst effects of climate change and can avoid the polluting development pathway followed by the developed countries.

Resolving these three issues – a goal that keeps Africa and the world safe, a fair contribution by the wealthy countries, and adequate finance for efforts by poorer countries – is in everyone’s interests. It will take commitment and leadership at the highest levels, but I believe that, together, we can do it in Durban.

COP 17 is seen by many as an “end point” for the Kyoto Protocol, in that it is the last opportunity for meaningful negotiation before the first commitment period comes to an end. Firstly, would you agree with this view; and secondly, what do you think have been the major achievements of the Kyoto Protocol in particular and the COP process more generally so far?

COP 17 is not the “end point” for the Kyoto Protocol, but a “beginning point” for a second commitment period for the developed countries.

This is required by the Kyoto Protocol, and was affirmed by all countries when we started negotiating in 2005.

The mandate is quite simple: a single number representing what Annex I countries should do after 2013, and their individual contributions to this number.

Of course, we recognise that some wealthy countries are delaying the Kyoto negotiations. But Africa, as the most vulnerable continent, will not serve as the burial ground of the only legally binding treaty requiring those most responsible for causing climate change to reduce their climate pollution.

If the wealthiest countries, the greatest contributors to climate change, cannot or will not honour their promises, then what chance do we have of curbing the climate crisis? So our resolve is clear.

We acknowledge that three countries – Japan, Canada and Russia – have expressed reluctance to honour their promises. And, of course, the United States repudiated its commitments a number of years ago. But the world cannot be held hostage by a handful of countries.

Africa takes comfort from the recent statement by the European Union that it is willing to continue its leadership role among the developed countries to honour its second period of commitments, subject to certain conditions.

One of the stumbling blocks to the COP process in recent years has been a demand by some of the developed nations that big developing economies such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa should be required to commit to legally binding emissions reduction targets. Do you think there is likely to be broader consensus on this requirement and that emerging economies would be likely to make such commitments in order to keep the multilateral process on track?

This demand has been a stumbling block. The UN Climate Convention – the international “climate constitution” – is very clear about this. Historical responsibility lies with the developed countries: they are responsible for the vast majority of current atmospheric concentrations and their impacts on Africa.

Africa is calling on all countries to honour the deal struck in the 2007 Bali Road Map. We believe that 100% of global emissions must be covered under the “three pillars” agreed: firstly, the developed country Kyoto Parties must honour their Kyoto commitments; secondly, the US, which has repudiated the Kyoto Protocol, must take on comparable commitments under the Convention; and thirdly, all developing countries must take on “nationally appropriate” mitigation actions – recognising that what is appropriate for Chad and China may well be different.

This approach is very simple, it is fair. It is what we have agreed. The demand by developed countries that all “major economies” – including some developing countries – take on binding commitments departs from the deal in Bali.

If we depart from promises made as recently as 2007, then how can we trust what comes next?

Africa is more than willing to play ball, but only if the other side does not continue shifting the goalposts.

There have been a number of inter-sessional meetings since COP 16 and more will take place before Durban. Based on the progress made at these meetings, how confident are you that a second commitment period – and a broader, comprehensive agreement that includes all major emitters – will be decided in Durban?

Africa’s resolve is clear. The question is whether our negotiating partners are ready to do what is right according to science and to equity and to their existing legal commitments under the UN Convention and its Kyoto Protocol.

In setting expectations for Durban, we must all be quite clear that the mandate of our discussions requires, firstly, a second commitment period for the wealthy countries to reduce pollution under the Kyoto Protocol; and secondly, an “agreed outcome” to ensure the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention.

Under the Convention, the key issues include: whether we will have a global goal that keeps Africa safe, protects our food security, enables our ecosystems to adapt and safeguards our economic development; whether developed countries take on adequate and comparable mitigation efforts, in light of this global goal; and whether there is sufficient finance, technology and capacity to enable developing countries – including Africa – to cope with warming, and shift to lower emission pathways.

The African Group has a comprehensive and science-based position that would achieve these results. We are making progress in our discussions. Whether we will be successful in Durban is a question you must address to our negotiating partners.

Commentators have argued that if the necessary agreements are not concluded in Durban, there is a danger of what has been termed a “financing gap” after 2012. Could you comment on this? If such a gap were to arise, how would it affect the financing of adaptation and mitigation measures in Africa?

Finance is clearly one of the key issues for Durban. Africa has contributed virtually nothing to causing climate change (less than 4% of global emissions), yet we are willing to contribute to the solution. But we expect the polluters, and not the poor in Africa, to pay.

We welcome the efforts made so far by developed countries. But there are a number of concerns arising about financing, all of which need to be addressed as part of a balanced, ambitious and comprehensive outcome in Durban.

First, if Africa is to take on new actions, we need to ensure we are getting “new and additional” finance. So far, it is not clear how much of the short-term finance provided by developed countries between 2010 and 2012 is new and additional in practice, rather than merely on paper.

Second, there is a real “finance gap” between the level of finance necessary to implement the Convention, and the amount available. There is no commitment for 2013, and the pledge of $100 billion – while an important start – bears no relation to the level of need as identified by major institutions including the UN and World Bank.

Third, we are still to agree where the money is coming from. Durban must deliver an agreement on the “sources of finance” including the proportion of future finance that will come from public sources.

Closing the “finance gap” is essential for success in Durban. It is difficult to conceive how those countries that have contributed the least to climate change will commit to new actions (such as new monitoring, reporting and verification rules ), if those who have contributed most to climate change won’t fulfil their existing promises and commitments.

We are very willing to do our part; but developed countries must also fulfil their commitments.

What would constitute a ‘positive outcome’ for Africa in Durban? If we do not see a positive outcome in Durban, what do you think the implications are likely to be for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the “official” carbon trading market specifically, and the multilateral process more generally?

A positive outcome for Africa is an outcome that meets the challenge set by the science and by equity. It is an outcome that will keep Africa and its people safe and enable us to develop.

As noted, this requires three things: first, a co-operative global effort to curb emissions to safe levels; second, an effort to close the “mitigation gap” and ensure leadership and fair contributions by wealthy countries; and third, an effort to close the “finance gap” by ensuring developing countries have the means to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

If we do not see an adequate outcome from Durban, the prospect of carbon markets is bleak. This can be understood with some arithmetic that even my young children can manage.

Currently, the UN Environment Programme tells us we must achieve 12 gigatonnes of global reductions by 2020. Developing countries have pledged 5Gt, if supported with finance. This would leave at least 7Gt for the developed countries. Developed countries, unfortunately, have pledged less than 4Gt, and have around 4Gt available in so-called “loopholes”. So collectively, based on current pledges and loopholes, they are offering nothing. If they effectively have to do no reductions by 2020, why would they need to purchase carbon credits from Africa or elsewhere? This basic arithmetic must be studied carefully by developing countries.

It is for this reason Africa is saying that new carbon markets are conditional on developed countries agreeing to ambitious mitigation commitments, and that the use of markets should be limited to ensure developed countries actually change their own economies, rather than shifting the burden to developing countries.

There is much talk in the business media of “building the business case for climate change”. What key messages would you give to business in this regard?

Business plays a key role, both in curbing climate change and addressing its adverse effects. No one needs less convincing of this priority than the insurance industry, which is at the cutting edge of understanding around climate change.

All sectors of business must understand climate change – both the threats it poses, and the opportunities. The businesses that survive and prosper will be those that manage the transition well. This means managing in a more hostile climate, while also prospering from the transition to a low-carbon future.

The first challenge for business is to understand that Africa will warm more than 1.5 times the global average level. This implies major impacts in many economic sectors such as agriculture, industry and services. Adapting to these changes will require changes in business practices, while presenting new opportunities.

Business should also look to new financing mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund as a means to support new projects to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

African governments see African business as a major partner in tackling climate change. We look forward to tackling this problem together.

Andy Mason

[Editor’s Note: The second part of this interview will be published in the November issue of “Energy Forecast” magazine. For the full interview, visit www.oneworldgroup.co.za]

CLIMATE IMPACTS 2050: This geographical information systems map, prepared by researchers at OneWorld Sustainable Investments in Cape Town, shows the southern African regions most likely to bear the brunt of climate impacts and population changes by 2050. Red areas will be the hardest hit; blue areas the least. Climate impacts are defined as exposure to extreme weather events and high rainfall variability, combined with sensitivity to such stress in terms of socio-economic and ecological systems, landscape degradation and resource availability. Risk and vulnerability mapping is one element in a matrix of tools used by climate change researchers to provide information to decision-makers.
COP AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

• The Kyoto Protocol is an international legally binding agreement linked to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997, and given force from February 2005.

• The Protocol sets binding targets for 37 industrialised countries and the EU to reduce (mitigate) greenhouse gas emissions by an average of 5% against 1990 levels, between 2008 and 2012.

• While the Convention encouraged industrialised countries to stabilise emissions, the Protocol commits them to do so.

• The Protocol sees developed countries as historically responsible for high levels of GHG emissions after 150 years of industrial activity, and places a heavier burden on them.

• The Protocol employs three mechanisms – the carbon market; the Clean Development Mechanism; and joint implementation (JI) – that allow developed countries, through technology transfer and investment, to meet their targets by helping to remove carbon from the atmosphere in developing countries in return for carbon credits.

• As well as policing mitigation, the Protocol assists (mainly developing) countries to adapt to climate change. The Adaptation Fund, funded mainly by the CDM, was established to finance adaptation

• The Protocol is seen as the first step toward a global emission reduction regime capable of stabilising GHG emissions, and as the foundation for future international agreement on climate change.

• The first commitment period of the Protocol ends in December 2012, and a new international framework needs to take its place. This is what hangs in the balance at COP 17.